The Embodied Mind in Hindsight

At the end of my first post, I said that when I reread The Embodied Mind now, I can’t help but see it as limited by several shortcomings, ones that have become increasingly apparent over the years and that need to be left behind in order to advance the book’s project of enlarging cognitive science to include transformative experiences of the self and world, and enlarging human experience to include insights from cognitive science. To be specific, I no longer accept three of the rhetorical and argumentative strategies we used. The first strategy was our portrayal of Western phenomenology, in the tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, as a failed or broken down philosophical project (see Chapter Two). On the contrary, phenomenology continues to be a vital and important movement of lasting relevance to philosophy and cognitive science, as well as to the arts, medicine, and practical disciplines of human transformation. I’ve tried to show this at length in my book, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind.

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About Giorgio Bertini

Director at Learning Change Project - Research on society, culture, art, neuroscience, cognition, critical thinking, intelligence, creativity, autopoiesis, self-organization, rhizomes, complexity, systems, networks, leadership, sustainability, thinkers, futures ++
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